This study examines the historical linkages that developed between experiences of enslavement, the legacies of slavery, and ideas of freedom before and after abolition in the early twentieth century in an area of southern Senegal known today as the Kolda region. In the Fulfulde language, spoken by the majority of the population, there are several terms and expressions to talk about freedom. The first is ndimaaku, which people tend to equate with nobility and dignity. This is the freedom of the olden days of slavery, when the capacities and qualities of the male or female freeborn stood in stark contrast to those of the slave, and being free meant not having been a slave in the first place. The second term is heɓtaare, i.e., freedom in the sense of tranquility, economic well-being, and a general ease in life and social relations. The expression jeyaal-hoore mun conveys a sense of independence, self-mastery and autonomy, while heɓtugol hoore mun literally means to retrieve one's head, the center of individual thought and capacity for independent action. Politically, heɓtugol hoore mun stands for the end of colonial rule and the achievement of national independence. Socially, it refers to the emancipation of subordinated groups, like the youth and women, and it describes slaves who freed themselves from their masters. Drawing from archival sources and oral history, this essay attempts to reconstruct the discursive reconfigurations of local ideas of freedom within the context of the political and social changes that affected the Kolda region in the late nineteenth century, the early colonial period, and the years before decolonization. Each historical period had its own actors, dynamics and complexities in which slavery and then legacies of slavery played a role in the definition of freedom and the entitlement of people to its benefits. As demonstrated here, however, liberation paved the way for other forms of subjugation.
Introduction
What is meant by "freedom" is one of the least documented aspects of past and present African social life. There are of course exceptions, such as the seminal study of Paul Riesman on the construction of self and society amongst the Peul Jelgobe of Upper Volta (today Burkina Faso), or Harri Englund's ethnography of human rights activism in Malawi.1 Otherwise, Africa looms largely as the continent of unfreedom: the slave trade, colonial subjugation, Cold War dictatorships, the apartheid regime, civil wars, environmental disasters, and contemporary façade democracies all compound this image. Both anthropologists and historians have stressed African resilience to historical adversities, and theorized agency "not in terms of dependence and independence, but interdependence and intersubjectivity."2 Many have indeed described interrelatedness as a historically consolidated strategy of survival-a way to distribute of expansion. This external pressure added to Kaabu internal difficulties. Historians have explained the crisis of the confederacy within the context of the decline of the Atlantic slave trade and the parallel development of commercial groundnut cultivation in the regions south of the Gambia River. The first deprived the Kaabu Mandinka elite of their major source of revenue, while the second placed wealth to buy European weapons into the hands of commoners.11 Another important factor was Islamic reformism. While one part of the population followed traditional cults, the other was sensible to the proselytism of Islamic preachers who urged the separation of Muslims from unbelievers' settlements after centuries of peaceful cohabitation. These were the first moves towards the Islamic wars that tore Senegambia apart in the second half of the century.12 The most dangerous internal enemies of the Kaabu confederacy were the Muslim Mandinka, who supported Fouta Djallon,13 and the Fulbe communities that dwelt in Kaabu lands.14 In the eyes of Bundu and Fouta Jallon, all of these were natural allies.15 Emmanuel Betrand Bocandè, a French resident in the Casamance between 1849 and 1857, noted that the influence of Mandinka chiefs depended on the number of foulacounda-Fulbe villages-under their control, as these villages were a source of milk, meat and young men who fought alongside Mandinka youths.16 Bocandé also described the heavy presence of Fouta Djallon people in the western areas of Kaabu as much as sources of the same period reported regular raids of the Imamate along the middle and upper reaches of the Gambia River.17 Mud walls and stockades encircled all large Mandinka settlements, and caravans employed their own militia to protect men and goods.18 Large-scale hostilities started around 1850, when Labé, the northern province of Fouta Djallon, mobilized an army of nearly six thousand men to defeat Berekelon, one of the strongholds of Mandinka rule.19 Then, the joined forces of Fouta Djallon, Bundu and their local allies destroyed Kansala in 1867.20 While the British, French and Portuguese prepared colonial occupation, the peripheral leaders of Kaabu asserted their autonomy in the wake of collapsing Mandinka hegemony. 21 One of these leaders was Alpha Molo Balde, also known as Molo Eggue, a convert to Islam and ally of Bundu and Fouta Jallon, who in the early 1870s began to negotiate military and economic collaboration with the British and the French.22 The former were stationed at McCarthy Island, a commercial outpost established in 1823 that was located about 250 kilometers from the coast in the middle of the Gambia River. The French were at Sedhiou, the fort they constructed in 1838 on the north bank of the Casamance River. In 1875, Molo's army swept across the southern bank of the Gambia River from east to west, and then moved south into Guinea Bissau. For women the term is korɗo (plur. horɓe), while kaaɗo (pl: haaɓe) can be used for both men and women, as much as the two terms that describe the condition of the slave: maccungaaku and njiyaagu. The specific meanings of these words change according to historical periods and Fulfulde communities. In the Kolda region, jiyaaɗo is more used than maccuɗo, and N'gaïdé (L'esclave, 92, fn. 132) remarks the change of significance that the term acquired since Molo Eggue's times. Today, maccuɗo stands for the captive or the chattel slave, while jiyaaɗo is often translated as serf or slave descendant, like in Guinea Conakry. Jiyaaɗo, however, can equally mean, and probably meant in the past, the newly acquired slave. See M. Bazemo, "Une approche de la captivité par le vocabulaire chez
The second word that conveyed a sense of freedom (but also autonomy, selfsufficiency and independence) was heɓtaare. Mi heɓtima means "I am fine"-indicating no worry, hunger, illness, or conflict-while mi heɓtaaki is used for "I am restrained," or "I am pressed." Herders of Molo's time sought heɓtaare when they selected a place to stay with their cattle: a site that was far from farmers (so as to avoid conflict over spoiled crops), close to water and grassy areas, in harmony with the spiritual entities of the territory, and safe from cattle thieves and slave raiders. In this perspective heɓtaare implied a lack of restraints but also a positive conception of freedom in the sense that John Christman proposes: the person had the economic and social capabilities to handle one's life at its best.42 The expression jeyaal-hoore mun, literally "the property of one's head," describes the sense of self-autonomy that the individual achieves with full adulthood: the ability to formulate purposes and turn them into action in the awareness of being part of a larger social environment that demands respect for its rules and feelings. This kind of self-mastery is one of the pillars of ndimaaku freedom. The dimo of Molo's times took care of other people's needs, and the heɓtaare of his life was in principle the heɓtaare of all the people that lived under his protection. The fuldebbo43 acted kindly towards all people, . From the root yey (to own), jiyaaɗo could mean "he, who is owned"; from the same root comes the term jeyal: property. The second possibility is yiyeede (to be seen): jiyaaɗo, in that sense, would be "somebody who is seen." For the first interpretation see Botte, "Stigmates," 109, and Cristiane Seydou and David W. Arnott, Dictionnaire pluridialectal des racines verbales du peul: peul, français, anglais (Paris: Karthala, 1998), 142-143; for the second N'gaïdé, L'esclave, 92, fn. 132. Fulfulde has a special word to identify freed slaves; they are the ndiimaaɓe or riimaaɓe (sing. ndiimaajo), a category of people apart from the rimbe; this terms, however, is not used in the Kolda region where there are only the dimo and the jiyaaɗo. Each social category needed the other: the rimɓe could not do without the labor force of the jiyaaɓe, whilst the jiyaaɓe relied on rimɓe pastoral riches during the hard times of the rainy season. Their relation also had moral implications: "there could not be a dimo-as some elders say today-without a jiyaaɗo by his side."51 The generosity of the former related to the dependence of the latter; their respective personalities integrated the other. The crucial point is that the relative heɓtaare of some jiyaaɓe never meant ndimakuu: purity of origins. One had to be born dimo in order to learn and display ndimakuu freedom, and only a dimo was a true Fulbe: dimo and pullo-the term to indicate the Fulbe man-were interchangeable. Did Molo and Musa ever claim this kind of freedom for themselves? This is a delicate topic because today, if asked about ndimaaku, some jiyaaɓe change the subject, as they fear the shame (hersa, called seemtende in other parts of the Fulbe archipelago)52 which results from entering into a discussion that does not really belong to them.53 Being hersa one of the core qualities of ndimaaku, they show in action (but not in words) their sound knowledge of the lowers. Men of slave origins thus had a chance to establish their autonomous hamlets without relying on rimɓe's support: having a wife was difficult in those times of polygamy, more so for a jiyaaɗo, who had to wait for his master to get one for him. A new model of freemen emerged based on the idea that the qualities of a person did not depend on ancestry but rather destiny, moral and physical strength, and to some extent sacrifice.60 As with other nineteenthcentury European and North Atlantic ideas of liberty, these possibilities were not available to all human beings but were rather restricted to adult men, the only ones entitled to the benefits and the social and political responsibilities of freedom. The novelty of Molo and Musa's message lay in the fact that each man had the right to develop his potential to advance economically, socially and politically. The freeman of their times asserted his leadership over a network of wives, children, relatives, dependents and even slaves, and fully participated in the decision-making of the local community. It is a curious fact that a Fullah will, without hesitation, when asked tell one whether is freeborn or not."70 The most significant process set in motion by colonization was not the liberation of the slaves but the reassertion of the old legacy of jiyaaɓe and rimɓe cohabitation and hierarchical collaboration that occurred over the trend of liberation set in motion by Molo and by Musa. Literature on French West Africa provides ample evidence of how colonial officials tried to minimize the impact of abolitionary regulations on the ground.71 In the case of the Upper Casamance, there is no trace of any effort made to inform the population about the end of slavery or of the slave trade. Even more relevant for the analysis of jiyaabe and rimɓe relations is the fact that by asserting their leadership over the legacies of Musa, whom they started to depict as a tyrant feared by the population beginning in the 1890s,72 the French ended up indirectly supporting the restoration of rimɓe power. One of the major written sources on the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century history of Fuladu is a report written in 1904 by the French Resident Charles de La Roncieré.73 In it, there is evidence that Molo and Musa made concessions to the economic and social power of the rimɓe. For instance, Musa exempted the rimɓe villages from the corvées that had become part of Fuladu social life because of the 1896 treaty with the French. The French needed porters to travel through Fuladu, and Musa became responsible for road maintenance: the rimɓe villages did not participate in this effort, just as they did not join the gangs of men and women who cultivated Musa's fields of millet and groundnuts near his capital Hamdallay.
Power Restoration in the First Part of the Twentieth Century
At the same time, Molo and Musa's repeated attacks on ndimaaku produced their results. In a way similar to the British report quoted above, de La Roncieré reported that the rimɓe had learned to let powerful jiyaaɓe marry their daughters, and in order to acknowledge the children of these unions they had even started to say that ndimaaku depended on the mother, rather than on the father. It was under the umbrella of the French civilizing mission that local ideas of freedom and slavery as hereditary conditions gained a renewed strength. French officials in this period believed that Africans were inferior to French people. Nonetheless, this difference had gradients; some groups were closer, while others were more distant from the French. The French liked the Fulbe: their physical appearance-tall, lean and light-skinned-set them apart from other Senegambians and their aristocratic manners impressed French officials, even those with Republican ideals and an anti-feudal stance.74 The Fulbe they talked about were the rimɓe, because they came to share the rimɓe's view that the jiyaaɓe were not truly Fulbe, and were eternal outcasts of Fulbe society. For de La Ronciére, the fula jongo, whom another French official, Liotard, had described some years before as a combination of Mandinka and Fulbe virtues, was instead a man of all races.75 His list of Fuladu regions and influential men distinguished between chiefs of noble or slave origins. All were Musa's men, as Musa had followed Molo's line to entrust several areas of Fuladu to the control of the rimɓe in exchange for heavy tributes in cattle, and to nominate men of slave origins and members of other ethnic groups to positions of responsibility. The perspective of de La Ronciére was different. In the fear that Musa would later try to return to the Upper Casamance, he distrusted men too close to him, preferring instead rimɓe influential personalities, whose support he thought he could reasonably gain even if they had been loyal to Musa. There was some wisdom in this perspective. Rimɓe resented the seizing of their cattle even more than that of their daughters, and some herding families had moved to the north bank of the Gambia River precisely to avoid Molo and Musa's requests of cattle in support of the army.
One particular passage of de La Ronciére opens a window on the repositioning of the rimɓe vis-a-vis the jiyaaɓe. The French Resident remarked on Molo's slave origins and downplayed his political leadership by depicting him as the companion of two free Fulbe: "three among them, having nothing more to lose, decided to fight the oppressors. They were Coly Demo of Sabary, Samba Eggue of Dialaba, and Molo Eggue-after known as Alpha, of Soulabally. Two among them were freeborn Fulbe (fula forolo), Molo Eggue was a Fulbe born in slav-ery (Foula dion), but his reputation as elephant hunter made him a precious attendant in the eyes of the others."76
Representatives of influential rimɓe families subscribed to this view, which has today become the Kolda version of Fuladu history. Mohammadou Falai Balde's version, as well as oral history from The Gambia, expose instead the tensions between Molo, Musa and the rimɓe. By putting Molo behind, and not in front, de La Ronciére was giving voice to a cry that has long resonated throughout the Kolda region at election time: "jiyaaɗo lamatako,"77 or "the jiyaaɗo cannot lead." Politicians have used it strategically to pit their jiyaaɓe constituencies against rimɓe candidates. In de La Ronciére's time, the same cry served to undermine the political, social and economic upgrading that some of the jiyaaɓe enjoyed under Molo and Musa. It took time but chiefs of jiyaaɓe origins either lost their position or were unable to establish a line of descendants that retained the powers given to them by Musa. In addition, the end of warfare eliminated one of their main sources of revenue. It is true that the jiyaaɓe were more competent farmers than the rimɓe, but as made clear by the Roland Portères' Mission of the 1950s on the problems of Senegalese agriculture, the cash-crop economy of groundnuts created "a new class of serfs, or perhaps it would be better to say 'slaves.'"78 Portères was talking about the groundnut basin, the region north of the Gambia River where commercial agriculture expanded more significantly thanks to the collaboration between commercial companies, the colonial state and the Muslim religious elite. The social structure of the Upper Casamance was different: religious leaders were few and their influence confined to their agricultural settlements. Influential men there instead included traders, representatives of European commercial companies, rimɓe canton chiefs and cattle-owners. Thanks to the labor of jiyaaɓe-which they obtained in exchange for cattle, milk and millet during the difficult months of the rainy seasons, when granaries were empty and peasants toiled in the fields-the latter had caught up with commercial groundnut cultivation, and their herds benefitted from the vaccination campaigns of the colonial state. were rimɓe by the 1950s. Through their kin, kindred and close associates they controlled the lower apparatus of the colonial state and economy: the "sons" of chiefs acted as tax collectors, rural constables, census officials, and served in the ranks of the Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance (sip), the early French West African version of cooperatives. 80 The jiyaaɓe, who belonged to the chieftaincy houses and their social networks, enjoyed some of their masters' privileges; the others stayed at the bottom of the Upper Casamance social ladder-a hungry workforce of peasants that experienced all the coercion of indigénat, i.e. the special penal code for French colonial subjects.81 Oral history uses three terms to explain how people turned into jiyaaɓe before colonization: through capture (nanngugol), purchase (soodugol), and asking for refuge (moolagol). 82 Only the latter remained in use after abolition as part of the experiences of the numerous immigrants from Portuguese and French Guinea, many of whom were of slave ancestry, who sought heɓtaare in the Upper Casamance.83 The other term, which applied to post-abolition jiyaaɓe, is terima, a Mandinka word typical only of the Fulfulde spoken in former Fuladu territories.84 It means "friendship" between people and families linked neither by capture nor purchase yet positioned as jiyaaɓe and rimɓe. It was easy to slip again into subjection by establishing relations of dependence with powerful rimɓe or with the canton chiefs, for whose protection individuals and communities negotiated, either forced by circumstances or voluntarily. The peasant with relations could try to pay his children off from military conscription or forced labor: he could have a role in sip, and hope to hide some of his cattle from the sharp eyes of the tax collector. The man without relations, instead, was an easy prey for the coercive system put in place by the French administration after having freed the indigenous population from the arbitrary rule of Musa and the chains of slavery. ,94 who traded in cattle and groundnuts. Because of cattle, he knew the rimɓe herders of the region. Because of his trade in groundnuts, he became familiar with the challenges of the average peasant. Food distribution or debt cancellation could win the vote of any farmer. Diop was also friendly to the Diao, one of the influential rimɓe families on the eastern side of the Kolda region. Some say that Yoro became the candidate for Velingare because he was a relevant figure within the mfdc. However, others underlined that the canton chief himself recommended him because of his education. At the time nobody really understood how radical he was. The Velingara side of the Upper Casamance was one of the areas where the dependence of the jiyaaɓe on the rimɓe was strongest. Difficult to access, it was a commercial frontier for Gambian traders, an underpopulated territory suitable to groundnut cultivation and cattle herding. Rimɓe villages were economically strong but few in number. The jiyaaɓe largely outnumbered them: it was only a matter of putting history in motion again. His jiyaaɓe ancestry linked Yoro to the majority of the population whose needs he Though many elders of Bassy's generation admired Senghor more than any other president of Senegal, he did remain a distant personality: he did not speak Fulfulde, and people listened to his discourses through interpreters. Yoro, instead, mastered the language. Fulfulde is rich in metaphors that stem from the long association of the Fulbe with the bush. For instance, the rimɓe are associated with the small red monkeys, and the jiyaaɓe with the bigger black ones.96 Yoro used ordinary daily expressions, such as the simple morning greeting honopindom (are you well awake?) to instill in the people a sense of growing awareness or even enlightenment, which in Fulfulde is pinnal.97 The act of retrieving one's independence-hettugol hore mun-passed through a change of mentality: the jiyaaɓe had to look directly in the eyes of the rimɓe and show them that they were brave, strong, and that they were the founders of Fuladu. Did they ignore that Molo had the same origins as them? Elizabeth Schmidt has observed how this generation of African politicians revived local traditions that their French education had taught them to despise.98 For Yoro, there was an additional element: by definition people without history, the jiyaaɓe were the people who had made Fuladu. In 1957, his militants gained over thirty-four seats in the General Assembly of the Société Mutuelle Production Rurale (smpr) for the Kolda Subdivision, one of the manifestations of the sip in the 1950s. The victory was a local refraction of the radical reforms that Mamadou Dia, at the leadership of Senegalese government after the Loi Cadre of 1956, was trying to promote in the agricultural sector. 99 The smpr were to become real cooperatives in order to empower the peasantry against the interests and pressures of foreign commercial companies and rural patrons. The key to such developments was the method of rural animation, which entrusted local intellectuals like Yoro with the responsibility of making people aware of the freedoms and rights attached to their new status as citizens.100 This "populist revolution from below" troubled the rural notables and patrons who supported Senghor and Dia.
Dia's efforts to boost rural change increased after the achievement of independence in 1960, and as a reaction, the Muslim religious leaders of the groundnut basin began to plea for his removal.101 Kolda was a multi-ethnic town where each group sought social and economic promotion through participation in national politics. Peasant empowerment was not a priority for the city dwellers. Their dissatisfaction with Yoro's populism was matched by that of the rimɓe and of the trading elite whom jiyaaɓe accused Yoro of racial politics. In the words of one of the participants in the political battles of those days, "he helped only his people."102 In 1962, Senghor had Mamadou Dia arrested after a confrontation between their respective supporters. Dia was Fulbe, and his downfall affected Fulbe politicians like Yoro as well as trade unionists, leftist intellectuals and leaders. All of them were set aside by the party and in the majority of cases posted to positions in the civil service in other parts of the country. 103 For the jiyaaɓe and the rimɓe of the Kolda region, it was the beginning of another historical phase. Relations of collaboration continued, but they were remunerated. All free citizens of the Republic of Senegal, they stood together at the bottom of a highly centralized political structure, which in the day-to-day reality of rural administration did not truly disown its colonial legacies.104
Conclusion
Crawford Young's review of African ideas of freedom underlines the difficulty of generalizing across the richness of languages, cultures and social organizations. Indigenous itineraries are as relevant as exogenous notions that have influenced the African intellectual universe thanks to "colonial occupation, Western education and Christian missions."105 The case of the Kolda region is exemplary in this respect. Molo and Musa reframed the relations between freedom and slavery within the context of a turbulent period of economic, political and social innovations. The outcomes were controversial. On the one hand, they were late actors of the long age of enslavement: in their military campaigns, they captured hundreds of men, women, and children, trafficked in slaves and profited from slave labor. At the same time, they fully participated in the age of emancipation. They were not abolitionists but rather men who tried to conquer freedom according to the standards of their times. Under the cover of colonial rule, the rimɓe reestablished their social privileges. For sure, colonization provided opportunities of emancipation to men of the likes of Yoro Kande, which researchers focused on the end of slavery in Africa have often emphasized. But it also meant also the daily oppression of peasants, and most importantly the stiffening of indigenous social hierarchies under the overarching umbrella of colonial ones.
Elizabeth Schmidt has argued that the struggles for citizenship of the 1950s were more than top-down politics, as battles against the power structures of colonialism had already unfolded on the ground. The legacies of slavery played a role in the decolonization of British Gambia and Sierra Leone, and in the northern regions of Cameroon, which shared with the Upper Casamance the fact of being predominantly Fulbe areas, they brought into the national struggles the diverging aspirations of former masters and slaves. The former looked forward to restoring the practices that colonial abolition had swept away; the latter sought further emancipation.106 Also in Fouta Djallon, which colonization had turned into one of the provinces of French Guinea, slavery played its part in regional politics. Here, the pre-colonial elite of freemen continued to dominate politically and freed slaves and people of slave descent amounted to one-quarter of the population.107 The figures of the Upper Casamance, as mentioned in the introduction, were even higher. Unlike in French Guinea, however, the bds of Senghor and Dia never meant to destabilize regional hierarchies, and eventually Senghor and Dia parted precisely because of Dia's radical perspective on the economic and political empowerment of the peasants. While Guinea abolished chieftaincy immediately after independence in 1958, Senegal really managed a slow transition from a hereditary chiefship to professionally trained civil servants by transforming the canton chiefs into chefs 
